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COMMENT
WASHINGTON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: THE
DUPLICATE TASK OF COMMISSION AND COURTS IN
HEARING APPEALS UPON THE FACTS
There are few instances in the law when a litigant can appeal to
three successive tribunals upon findings of fact alone, and obtain a
complete rehearing in each of them Such is the anomalous procedure
permitted in cases arising under our Industrial Insurance Act That,
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
and the provision for a jury sitting on the second appeal, may help to
explain the frequency with which "Blank v Department of Labor and
Industries" appears in our advance sheets
I
Washington has a compulsory industrial insurance law,' protecting
workmen engaged in "extrahazardous work" Unlike almost all other
compensation statutes, it provides specific sums for certain disabilities
and degrees of partial disability 2 The workman or his dependent makes
application directly to the Department of Labor and Industries, ap-
pending a physician's certificate, or proof of death 8 The department
renders a decision and notifies the interested persons, including the
employer, whose premium rate is affected 4 The award, if any, is paid
from the state's accident fund I
As originally drawn, this pioneer statute did not provide for any
formal administrative rehearing 6 Instead, a proceeding in superior
court was established, for review of the department's decisions on ques-
tions of fact, and its interpretation of the statute, "it being the intent
that matters resting in the discretion of the department shall not be
subject to review The proceedings in every such appeal shall be infor-
mal and summary " The calling of a jury rested in the discretion of
the court, except in cases where penalties were sought against the em-
ployer for failure to provide mandatory safeguards, or for his refusal
to submit for inspection pertinent records Its verdict was advisory
only "In all court proceedings under or pursuant to this act, the
decision of the department shall be prima facie correct, and the burden
of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same "s
The intention of these provisions was clearly discernible from the
first section of the act(t all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private
controversy and sure and certain relief for workmen and
their families and dependents is hereby provided ; and to
that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such
personal injuries and all jurisdictions of the courts of the state
over such causes are hereby abolished, except as in this act
provided ,,
This then-novel concept was at once challenged It was said to fly
in the face of our state constitution, which provides that the right of
'WASH REM R a STAT (1932) § 7673 et seq, conveniently compiled in
"Industrial Insurance and Medical Aid Acts as Amended by Session Laws
of 1945" Division of Industrial Insurance Olympia
2
RE1VL REv STAT § 7679, as amended
R EM REv STAT § 7686
'R M REV STAT § 7697; Cf Cole v. Dept, 200 Wash 297 93 P (2d) 413(1939); Mickelwait, The Washington Workmen's Compensation Act from
the Employers' Viewpoint (1940) 15 WAsH L R.. 1325 REn REV STAT §§ 7676, 77056 Washington was among the ten states which adopted workmen's com-
pensation acts in 1911 I SCHNEIDER, WORKMEn'S COMPENSATION (3d ed
1941) 11.
7McLaren v Dept 6 Wn (2d) 164 167, 107 P (2d) 230, 231 (1940);
Larson Administrative Determinations and the Extraordinary Writs in the
State of Washington (1945) 20 WASH L. REv 22, 27
aWAsE. REM CoiP STAT (1922) § 7697; WASH REMi CODE (1915) §
6604-20
9 REM REV STAT § 7673
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trial by jury shall remain inviolate Our court, through Judge Fullerton,
gave an answer which must be respected for its fresh insight upon the
question: 0
"The common law system of making awards for personal
injuries has no such inherent merit as to make a change unde-
sirable No one knows better than judges of courts of nisi
prius and of review that the common law method of making
such awards, even in those instances to which it is applicable,
proves in practice most unsatisfactory All judges have been
witnesses to extravagant award made for most trivial injuries
and trivial awards made for injuries ruinous in the(ir) nature;
and perhaps no verdicts of juries are interfered with so often
by the courts as verdicts making awards in such cases There
is no standard of measurement that the court can submit to
the jury by which they can determine the amount of the award
The test of reasonableness means but little to the ordinary
juror Unused as he is generally to witnessing the results of
injuries, he is inclined to measure his verdict by the amount
of disorder he observes, rather than by the actual amount
of disablement the injury has caused Nor is he aided in this
respect by the testimony of medical experts Conflicting as
such testimony usually is, it tends rather to confuse than to
enlighten him Perhaps the whole difficulty lies in the fact that
the question is too much one of opinion and not enough one
of fact I1  The desirability of this substitution is unques-
tioned, and we believe that the legislature had the power to
make it without violating any principle of the fundamental
law 1 2
"The objection may be answered also in another way
The right to trial by jury accorded by the constitution, as
applicable to civil cases, is incident only to causes of action
recognized by law The act here in question takes away the
cause of action, on the one hand, and the ground of defense,
on the other; and merges both in a statutory indemnity, fixed
and certain the right of trial by jury is thereafter no longer
involved in such cases The right of jury trial being incidental
to the right of action, to destroy the one is to leave the other
nothing upon which to operate "'1
20 State ex rel Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash 156, at 209, 117
Pac 1101, at 1119 (1911) The court discussed at length three other objec-
tions to the act-that it violated due process clauses of the state and national
constitutions, that it violated the privileges and immunities clause of the
state constituti6n, and the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion, and that it violated tax provisions of the state constitution
"1 See 2 WiGoMRE, EVmIENcE (3d ed 1940) § 663
22 Accord, Borgnis v Falk Co, 147 Wis 327, 133 N W 209, 215 (1911)
"To speak of the common-law personal injury action as a remedy for this
problem is to jest with serious subjects, to give a stone to one who asks
for bread The terrible economic waste, the overwhelming temptation
to the commission of perjury and the relatively small proportion of the
sums recovered which comes to the injured parties in such actions, condemn
them as wholly inadequate to meet the difficulty"
3 Judge Chadwick dissented from this portion of the opinion; he doubted
that the legislature could take from the worker his right to have the amount
of compensation "fixed by an authority less than the very people, who have
said 'the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate"' 65 Wash at 214,
117 Pac at 1121
1946)
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This last reason was approved by the United States Supreme Court
in 1917, in Mountain Timber Company v State of Washington, which
sustained the constitutionality of our act '4
In this stage of the law our court adopted the attitude that the de-
cision of the department upon the amount of an award would be dis-
turbed only "where the discretion of the department in that regard has
been exercised in a capricious and arbitrary manner "I"
In 1927 the Washington Legislature completely altered the character
of appeals in workmen's compensation cases "I It provided that any
party aggrieved by the decision of the department should have sixty
days in which to apply17 for a hearing before a joint board of three
officials of the department The application sets forth the party's
objections and must contain a detailed statement of facts upon which
he relies in support thereof The joint board may amend the order
without further hearing, but otherwise is directed to hold a hearing
on the issues raised, either in the county where the applicant resides,
or in the county where the injury occurred Such rehearing is de novo
and summary In practice it is conducted by examiners, 8 as per-
mitted by the act, but the record is considered by the joint board, and
the decision is that of a majority thereof
This administrative rehearing accords with general practice in the
United States-at least thirty-two of the states, territories and posses-
sions provide discretionary or mandatory rehearing before the commis-
sion or an independent board, before appeal can be taken to the courts 1'
In this same 1927 amendment the legislature greatly enhanced the
scope of court review It repealed the provision that matter within the
discretion of the department should not be subject to review, and in-
stead provided:
"On such appeal the hearing shall be de novo (but confined
to the department's record) If the court shall determine
that the Department has acted within its power and has cor-
rectly construed the law and found the facts, the decision of
the Department shall be confirmed; otherwise, it shall be
reversed or modified "
Our court, as late as 1930, interpreted this amendment, in its en-
tirety, as implementing the administrative procedure, rather than vest-
ing a greater degree of responsibility in the courts Babic v Department
of Labor and Industries emphasized the creation of a special agency
to rehear the case
1"243 U S 219 (1917), decided together with New York Cent Ry v
White, 243 U S 188, sustaining the New York act
"1McMullin v Dept, 120 Wash 525, 526, 207 Pac 956, 957 (1922)
1" WAsH LAWS 1927, c 310, § 8, substantially the same as Rxm Rxv STAT
§ 7697
" This extended the time limit fi om an original 30 days
1" Interview with Asst Atty -Gen Gallagher
"Eight jurisdictions have court administration of workmen s compensa-
tion, and are therefore not comparable
References to foreign jurisdictions, in this comment, are based upon the
writer's analysis of appeal provisions in the various acts as set out in
SCHNEIDER, WORKMcEN'S COMPENSATION STATUTES (1940), and pamphlet sup-
plements to 1943
Alaska, Hawaii, Philippine Islands and Puerto Rico are included Dis-
trict of Columbia under protection of the Longshoremen's Act is not
considered here
Only Mississippi, of the states has no act The Nevada statute makes no
apparent provision for appeals
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"The manifest theory and plan of the workmen's compen-
sation law is to commit its enforcement to the officers of the
department, who, by training and experience, become ac-
quainted with and give their time and attention to the solution
of its peculiar problems, with as little appeal to the courts as
necessary ,,2o
The court, in another case in the same year, applied the traditional
administrative law formula: "  since the amount of the award was
discretionary and no arbitrary or capricious action was shown, the court
was not at liberty to disturb it "1
2
.
But such was not the intention of the lawmakers In 1939 the legis-
lature added the right of "trial" by jury to the trial court review, by
enacting a new section:
"In all appeals to the superior court either party shall
be entitled to a trial by jury upon demand The jury's verdict
in every such appeal shall have the same force and effect as
in actions at law ,"22 Evidence is limited to the departmental
record 2
It is interesting to note in passing what a rare bird this is, in tra-
ditional law practice: a jury hearing an appeal Somewhat similar cases
are a suit initiated in justice court, where there is a right to retrial be-
fore a jury in a court of record, 24 and a probate matter initiated in
county court, where statute provides a jury hearing on appeal in cir-
cuit court 25 But in both these cases the juries hear the witnesses In
our superior court, they hear only the reading of the transcript
To return to the subject, it appears that the appeal provisions of our
workmen's compensation act, as they have emerged in the form just
indicated, accord with the general legislative policy in this state Appeals
from administrative determinations in Washington, generally, allow
for a retrial of the facts 2' Most of the Washington statutes relating
to appeals from decisions of administrative bodies attach no presump-
tion of correctness to their determinations 2 7
:0 156 Wash 537, 539, 287 Pac 32, 33 (1930)
Van Bellinger v Dept, 157 Wash 70, 75, 285 Pac 1115, 1116 (1930)
22 WAsir, LAws 1939, c 184, § 1, appearing as Rnm Rv STAT § 7697-2
No legislative history is available, but apparently the measure was favored
by the Washington State Bar Associattion. See Ott, Bar Representation
Before Legislature Proves Effective (1939) 14 WASH L Rav 346
" The peculiar theory previous to this amendment was that the workman
made his case before the joint board, and the department presented fresh
evidence in rebuttal upon the "appeal" in superior court; e g, Pavlinovich
v Dept, 158 Wash 374, 290 Pac 876 (1930)
-'1Capital Traction Co v Hot, 174 U S 1 (1898)25McKenney v Minaghan, 119 Wis 651, 97 N W 489 (1903) is an
example26 Larson, Administrative Determinations and the Extraordinary Writs
in the State of Washington (1945) 20 WAsE. L REv, at 2427 Ibid, Evidence that these amendments were calculated to encourage
appeals is the provision extending the time for making them, Rmv. REV
STAT § 7697 The usual period is much shorter; Vermont, providing initial
appeal to superior court, allows ten days, and five days thereafter within
which to appeal to the supreme court on matters of law Other acts penalize
unnecessary appeals, by assessing costs, or altering the amount of the
award
1946]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The matter of practice under our Industrial Insurance Act is con-
cisely covered in an article appearing in the WASHINGTON LAW RE-
viEw,2 8 but a brief outline here is desirable for the purpose of this
comment
After the case is called in superior court, and a jury settled, if one
is demanded, the lawyers read aloud through that part of the depart-
ment's record which is pertinent to the issue, and admissible by law
court standards 29 One reads the questions, and another the answers
Instructions are read to the jury After argument it retires with ex-
hibits, instructions and interrogatories 10 Technically, it must first de-
termine whether there is any evidence to refute the finding of the joint
board At any rate, it answers the interrogatories, and that decides
the questions If for claimant, the verdict may find a different degree
of disability, or aggravation where the department found none, or, in
rare cases, the actual sum due him, and the court remands the case to
the department with instructions, and if the verdict is for the depart-
ment, the court affirms its decision 31
There are of course certain limits upon the jury's power The case
may be dismissed at conclusion of claimant's evidence 32 The jury's
verdict will be set aside if there is no substantial evidence to support
it " A new trial can be granted " And, where the jury has been
permitted to give a verdict in terms of money rather than percentage of
disability, such amount may be reduced to the statutory maximum 35
On the other hand, consider Peterson v Department of Labor and In-
dustries, where P was awarded permanent total disability by the depart-
ment and appealed because he was employed and desired a lesser
classification The jury found that he was entitled to $7,540 permanent
partial disability compensation The court reduced this to $4,940 in
lieu of new trial, and the department appealed relying upon the ground
that P was not an "aggrieved person" entitled to a hearing in superior
court The supreme court rejected this argument, and held furthermore
that P was not bound by the statutory maximum of $2,400 because the
department had not made sufficient and timely objection, and P's
instruction was the law of the case 11
The statutory provision that the decision of the department shall be
prima facie correct and the burden of proof shall be upon the party
attacking the same has been interpreted to mean that if, in the opinion
28 Geisness, Procedure to Secure Benefits Under the Workmen's Corn-
pensation Act (1940) 15 WASH L 1Rsv 62; see also MAmu H. WIGrr and
Juasox T KLINGBERG, WASHINGTON STATE WoRKaIMN'S COMPENSATION (1942)
29 Hutchings v Dept, 167 P (2d) 444 (1946), Brown v Dept, 161 P (2d)
533 (1945) The supervisor's record contains much matter to be weeded out
before presentation in court Hutchings case at 448
"Sample instructions and interrogatories are found in Champagne v
Dept, 22 Wn (2d) 412, 156 P (2d) 422 (1945), and Husa v Dept, 20 Wn(2d) 114, 146 P (2d) 191 (1944)
21 That this procedure in superior court is truly appellate, see Boeing
Aircraft Co v Dept, 22 Wn (2d) 423, 427, 156 P (2d) 640, 642 (1945) (rule
against new evidence absolute); Merchant v. Dept, 165 P (2d) 661 (1946)(court may not go beyond particular issue raised by order appealed from);
WIGHT and KLINGBERG WASHINGTON STATE WORKIVIEN'S COMPENSATION 494.32 E g, Larson v Dept, 166 P (2d) 159 (1946)
31Kravelich v Dept, 161 P (2d) 661 (1945).
8"Yokum v Dept, 22 Wn (2d) 72, 154 P (2d) 306 (1944)22Yockey v Dept, 21 Wn (2d) 171, 150 P (2d) 680 (1944)
22 Wn (2d) 647, 157 P (2d) 298 (1945)
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of the reviewing court, the evidence as to a factual issue is evenly
balanced, the finding of the department as to that issue must stand 37
But even this doubtful restraint disappears in jury cases "We hold that
the presumption accorded to the findings of the joint board lost its
force and effect when the jury decided the questions of fact which were
presented to it The verdict of the jury in such cases, when based upon
substantial evidence, forecloses a further consideration of the pre-
sumption accorded to the order of the joint board ",11
The department, the claimant or the employer may then appeal to the
supreme court, which, if the case was heard without a jury in superior
court, is obliged to review the record once again 39
II
What I have sought to point out is an evolution in the local pro-
cedure for securing industrial accident compensation, a trend to facilitate
appeals, and minimize the force of administrative determinations This
trend is such that some judges in effect deny even the prima facie
correctness of the joint board's determinations, on the ground that it
has access only to the transcripts of testimony, and is no better qualified
to judge of its credibility than are the judges 40 It may well be that this
trend is the result of certain basic features of our present Industrial
Insurance Act, which are here mentioned briefly
First and foremost is the fixed-sum schedule for awards, having no
relation to the workman's income, or to the cost of living 41 Some
judges have balked at enforcing this provision, or, as they express it,
the court's interpretation of the statute They believe that even with
the statute as it is presently drawn, the primary consideration in each
case should be loss of earning power 42 But this view does not prevail,
and it is small wonder that injured workmen (and the courts) have
turned to sympathetic juries for relief
Again, there is a basic conflict of opinion between those judges who
consider the act one for the insurance of the risks of extrahazardous
industry only, and those who deem that it embraces virtually any
7 McLaren v Dept, 6 Wn (2d) 164, 107 P. (2d) 230 (1940), Judge Millard
dissenting upon the ground that more weight should be accorded the de-
partment's findings
"Alfredson v Dept, 5 Wn. (2d) 648, 652, 105 P (2d) 37, 39 (1940)
(rejecting argument that presumption should be considered and applied by
supreme court to facts as presented to jury) This case was approved in
specifically rejecting the finding of the joint board, based upon substantial
medical evidence, in Sumerlin v Dept, 8 Wn (2d) 43, 111 P. (2d) 603 (1941)3 E g, McLaren v Dept, supra note 37; see Wight and Klingberg, loe
cit supra note 31
0 See Ferguson v Dept, 197 Wash 524, 85 P (2d) 1072 (1938), Judge
Steinert dissenting to this proposition. In McLaren v Dept., cited above,
the court said, " neither the joint board nor the trial judge saw or
heard the witnesses They merely read a transcript of the testimony, and
were in no better position to judge of its weight than we are" (referring
to testimony of widow) See also Dick v Dept, 165 P (2d) 853 (1946)(dissent), LaLone v Dept, 3 Wn (2d) 191, 100 P (2d) 26 (1940) (dissent),
Ames v Dept., 193 Wash 215, 74 P (2d) 1027 (1938) (dissent)
'
1 Legisl (1941) 16 WAsH, L IRsv 153 Only Wyoming has a like scheme
of compensation
Perhaps our adoption of this system, in 1911, can be traced to the
doubtful constitutionality of such acts at that time See Mountain Timber
Company v State of Washington
"1 Dissent by Judge Grady, Champagne v Dept, 22 Wn. (2d) at 420, 156
P (2d) at 425, and cases therein cited
1946]
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affliction sustained during working hours The conflict arises, normally,
over the interpretation of "injury", and is well defined in McCormick
Lumber Co v Department of Labor and Industries3 and Bergagna v
Department of Labor and Industries, two so-called "heart cases" In
the Bergagna case the minority stoutly dissented:
"To hold that relatives of a deceased employee may secure
the benefits of the law when that employee dies on the job
because of ordinary exertion and without the happening of an
accident, makes for extra-hazardous occupations a mecca for
all ailing workmen who, by securing employment in occupa-
tions covered by the act, may obtain life insurance without the
payment of premiums ,44
It would seem that a renewed expression of legislative policy would
assist the department in settling such cases without recourse to the
courts
Another feature of the Washington law should be considered The
officers of the department are charged with two functions-administra-
tion of the accident funds, and decision of disputed claims against them
Claims may press, and even exceed, the particular fund set aside to
meet them 11 In this situation the officers may be driven, perhaps
unconsciously, to adopt the attitude of insurance adjustors, resolving
close cases against the claimants In this view, it is understandable that
claimants should seek disinterested review by the courts
By contrast, West Virginia, which likewise maintains a workmen's
compensation fund, has made scrupulous provision for an independent
review board, "to be composed of three members, none of whom shall
be a contributor to the compensation fund or in any way connected
with a contributor thereto and none of whom shall be a beneficiary of
the compensation fund or in any way connected with a beneficiary
thereof Two members of such board shall be of opposite politics to the
third All members of said board shall be appointed by the Governor
for a term of six years 46 Appeal from its decision is to the supreme
court of appeals, at the court's discretion 47
III
If it is desirable to withdraw industrial accident cases from the law
courts, as appears from our original act, and from the experience of
almost all other jurisdictions in the United States,48 then, I submit, these
recent changes in jurisdiction and procedure are a backward step There
is evidence to confirm this conclusion
,1 7 Wn (2d) 40, 108 P (2d) 807 (1941) (workman died while sawing
tree, found to have had acute preexisting disease) A late heart case is
Long-Bell Lumber Co. v Parry, 22 Wn (2d) 309, 156 P (2d) 225 (1945)
(workman, elderly, suffering from advanced coronary sclerosis, died while
sweeping floor)
"199 Wash. 273, 285, 91 P (2d) 551, 560 (1939), 14 WAsH L REv 329; cf
Boeing Aircraft Co v Dept, 22 Wn (2d) 423, 156 P (2d) 649 (1945); Ames
v Dept, 193 Wash 215, 74 P (2d) 1027 (1938).
,5 See Campbell v Dept, 2 Wn (2d) 173, 97 P (2d) 642, and Lassiter v
Dept., 2 Wn (2d) 182, 97 P (2d) 645 (1940), companion cases dealing with
insufficient "class fund" to pay warrants of claimants
'a WEST VIRGINIA OFFICIAL CODE (1931), c 23; LAWS 1935, c 78; LAWS 1937,
c 104; LAWS 1939, c 137
"7 Ibid In most states, of course, the commission is independent, being
concerned only with determining the employers' liabilityIs "The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to avoid litiga-
[VOL 21
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First, a random sampling of our state reports shows an amazing
increase in litigation of such cases before the supreme court In 1924
there were about 5 cases involving the Department of Labor and Indus-
tries before the supreme court, an average of 134 per volume, 1 page
for about 117 pages of opinions In 1930 there were about 2 cases per
volume, 1 page for every 63 or so pages In the past 3 reports49 there
have been 6 cases per volume, taking I page for every 14 in the reports
Second, there is abundant indication in the reports themselves to
confirm the observation of judge Fullerton in 1911 that the subject
matter of such cases is unsuited to court litigation, especially before
a jury
The question most often before the court is a medical one-sometimes
comparatively simple, 0 but often-times exceedingly complex 51 The
case turns, in almost every instance, upon the testimony of physicians52
-testimony which is, just as in 1911, inevitably in conflict Confusion
multiplies when, as in the Nilson case, nine eye-ear-throat specialists
appear 538 The expert testimony must ordinarily be phrased in hypo-
thetical questions,' "misused by the clumsy and abused by the clever,
(which) has in practice led to intolerable obstruction of truth "55 The
triers of fact must keep in mind the necessary distinction between
"objective" and "subjective" evidence,56 although the distinction is
sometimes exceeding fine 57
tion, as far as possible" Nega v. Chicago Ry, 317 Ill 482, 148 N E 250, 254
(1925); ef note, Court Review Limited to Questions of Law, STAsoN, CASES
AND OTHER MATERIALS ON ADMnISTRATIV TRIBUNALS (1937) 607
The most extreme position is taken in a special amendment to the United
States Employees Compensation Act, 56 STAT 1034 (1942), 42 U S C A §
1715 (1943): Action of the Commissioner shall be final and conclusive on
all questions of law and fact and not subject to review by any other
official of the United States or by any court by mandamus or otherwise
'0 22 Wn (2d) -, 123 Wash Dec -, 124 Wash Dec -. But note that the
proportionate number of appeals is very small In the past three years the
supervisor has treated just over a quarter of a million claims, of which
only 0 72 per cent were appealed to the joint board Of those, 409, or about
one-quarter, were appealed to the superior court
50 E g, whether trauma can be a contributing cause to appendicitis,
Clark v Dept, 131 Wash 256, 230 Pac 138 (1924), citing American Medical
Association Journal
U E g Cole v Dept, 200 Wash. 296, 93 P (2d) 413 (1939) (whether aneur-
ism of aorta preexisted the accident); Ferguson v Dept, 197 Wash 524, 85
P (2d) 1072 (1938) (whether aggravation is attributable to preexisting
osteo-arthritis or effects of accident); Nilson v Dept, 194 Wash 97, 77
P (2d) 593 (1938) (whether failing sight in one eye is due to tension
resulting from diabetes, or loss of sight and removal of other eye due to
accident)
3I2Kravelich v Dept, 161 P (2d) 661, 669 (1945) ("testimony of expert
medical witnesses is essentiaL"); Weinheimer v Dept, 8 Wn.(2d) 14, 17,
111 P (2d) 221, 222 (1941) ("actual facts must be determined from the
testimony of the medical witnesses"); LaLone v Dept, 3 Wn (2d) 191,
196, 100 P (2d) 26, 29 (1940) ("triers of fact must depend to a large extent
upon the testimony and conclusions of the physicians, testifying as experts,
who have made examinations of the workman's physical condition")
5* 194 Wash 97, 77 P (2d) 593 (1938) There were seven doctors in the
Ferguson case, nine in the Sumerlin case, six in Boyer v Dept 160 Wash
557, 295 Pac 737 (1931), to cite a few
" For example of misleading statements induced by hypothetical ques-
tions based upon claimant's statement of his case history, see Ferguson v
Dept, 197 Wash 524, 85 P (2d) 1072 (1938), reversed oan hearing en banc
r52 Wzoa o, EVIDENCE 812
6 E g, Kravelich v Dept, 161 P (2d) 661 (1945)
'Anderson v. Dept, 159 P (2d) 397 (1945) (existence of functional
complaints, possible traumatic neurasthenia)
1946]
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The extent of these problems can only be appreciated in the light of
practice The original investigation of the department is necessarily
informal Thereafter, in contested cases, the board's examiners, who are
not lawyers, take the evidence which is to be considered by the joint
board But the testimony of the doctors, if it is to be admitted to the
jury, must come somewhere close to meeting the requirements of
evidence in law trials "I Hence, if a doctor's report is not properly
sworn, it is not admissible although it was part of the supervisor's
record 59 And it has been held that testimony of the department's
medical witness is not available for use as claimant's evidence at the
court hearing, unless he makes the witness his own 1o Illustrating this
impasse between summary administrative procedure and court rules of
evidence61 is Cady v Department of Labor and Industries, wherein the
superior court excluded a photograph of claimant's injured hand, on
the objection that claimant himself could not appear before the jury
and show his injury (disapproved on appeal) 12
In this respect our act is deficient As has been pointed out, common
law rules of evidence affect the department's proceedings, because its
record must be open to review by a jury The only statutory guides
are that:
" Such rehearing (before the joint board) shall be de novo
and summary, but no witness' testimony shall be received
unless he shall first have been (sworn), or unless his testimony
shall have been taken by deposition ,63
"The Director of Labor and Industries shall, in accordance
with the provisions of this act:
1 Establish and promulgate rules governing the adminis-
tration of this act "64
Wigmore has stated his opinion that at common law the body of jury-
trial rules of evidence do not control the inquiry of administrative
bodies He considered that power vested in a commission to make its
own rules of procedure is an implied sanction of its independence of
jury-trial rules 65 Needless to say, such a theory does not obtain in
Washington, nor well could, in view of our peculiar appellate ma-
chinery 66
Third, to continue the enumeration of reasons for believing this
alteration in the method of appeal a backward step, it is unrealistic to
" Hutchings v Dept, 167 P (2d) 444 (1946)
59 Ibid
60 Larson v Dept, 16 P (2d) 159, 160 (1946) (ruling of superior court;
judgment of dismissal sustained on other grounds)81 That there is a necessary and essential distinction, see Wigmore,
Administrative Boards and Commissions: Are the Jury-Trial Rules of
Evidence in Force for Their Inquiries? (1922) 17 ILL L REV 263; Ross, The
Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evidence in Proceedings Before
Workmen's Compensation Commissions (1923) 36 HARv L REV 263; Pound,
J, dissenting in Matter of Carroll v Knickerbocker Ice Co, 218 N Y 435,
113 N E 607 (1916)
62162 P (2d) 813 (1945).
63 REM REV STAT § 7697
61REm REv STAT § 770365 Supra note 61, passim But cf : Ross, supra note 61, who disagrees
with the generalization that rule-making authority is sufficient He recom-
mends legislation specifically broadening the scope of evidence before such
commissions66Cf Geisness supra note 28 at 64 et seq
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try such cases to a jury The jurors are drawn from an industrial area,
almost necessarily 8 7 They know at the outset that it is an insurance
case 8 Evidence of the claimant's dependents, his earnings, and other
matters inducing sympathy somehow get into the record 69 Whereas
the department generally employs three non-partisan doctors who are
expert in their field (and generally adopts the finding most favorable to
the claimant) ,7 the claimant is represented by his own physician, or
another whose testimony is almost necessarily partisan 11 The jury,
which neither sees any of these doctors, nor has any special knowledge
of their professional reputations, can make any finding within the range
of the evidence, and be sustained 72 Another feature of trial to a jury
which results in prejudice is argument in terms of money, rather than
in terms of degrees of partial disability,72 the true question in the case
Fourth, this extended process is expensive to all parties concerned
For example, a "reasonable fee" for preparation and a day in superior
court may be $350 This, plus the costs of court and fees of medical
and other witnesses, is paid out of the insurance fund if the claimant
67It is said that the department cannot win a case in some localities
68 Four judges at least believe that suggestion of insurance behind the
defendant inflames the jury, and is prejudicial error Popoff v Mott, 14
Wn. (2d) 1, 126 P (2d) 597 (1942) (dissent)
Instructions seeking to inflame this prejudice, rejected, are found in
very recent cases: Hastings v Dept, 163 P (2d) 142 (1945) and Hutchings
v Dept, 167 P (2d) 444 (1946)
'd Attorneys with experience in these cases suggest that it is easy to
prepare a record favorable to a jury in view of the informal preliminary
hearings. That this is a difficult problem for the department, in practice,
see Hutchings case, above70 Interview, Miss Lomen But see: Ames v Dept, 193 Wash 215 221,
74 P (2d) 1027, 1029 (1938), Judge Blake dissenting in these words, "I
cannot agree that a departmental decision is prima facie correct, when it
ignores facts and rests solely upon the opinion of medical experts The
experts will always disagree, and the department will always believe its
own experts The principle upon which this case is decided will make
court review of departmental decisions an illusive formality, where there
Is conflict in medical testimony" (three judges concurring)
"'If a doctor does not affirmatively testify in claimant's behalf there is
no case See Zoff v. Dept, 174 Wash 585, 25 P.(2d) 972 (1933)
Wigmore strongly condemns partisan expert testimony, 2 EVmE cE § 563
2 E.g, Anderson v Dept, 159 P (2d) 397 (1945). But see: Ross, supra
note 61, at 264 "A woikmen's compensation commission is essentially an
administrative body It is a business organization designed to handle in abusiness way a complicated technical or business matter Commissioners
are presumably experts in their field, handling a great number of cases
all of which involve the same general questions It is inevitable that
with experience the commissioners become able to decide a question of fact
correctly on much less or different evidence than would be required to
convince a judge, let alone a motley jury unfamiliar with such issues"
73Cf Champagne v Dept, 22 Wn (2d) 412, 156 P (2d) 422 (1945) and
dissent thereto
Ohio, one of the few states with a system like ours, expressly forbids
such arguments, by statute
' "It shall be unlawful for any attorney engaged in any such appeal
to charge or receive any fee therein in excess of a reasonable fee, to be
fixed by the court in the case " RExi REV STAT § 7697 Reduced fee
of $350 approved in Peterson case, '"ecord read to jury was but seventy-five
pages in extent and the trial lasted but one day" One thousand dollar fee
reduced to $400 in Wintermute v Dept 183 Wash 169, 48 P (2d) 627 (1935),
in similar situation
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wins, and out of his pocket if he loses By an amendment, the depart-
ment's costs are paid out of the fund in any event 5
IV
Considering our industrial accident compensation procedure, we gain
valuable perspective by looking to experience in other states
First, we see that Washington stands almost alone in entrusting a
jury with review of its commission's findings 16 Washington is in a
minority even in admitting appeal to a trial court upon questions of
fact 77 Ten of the states which provide for appeals to trial courts never-
theless provide that the administrative findings of fact shall be con-
clusive upon such courts, 78 or substantially so 79 Fifteen states confine
appeals from their commissions to an appellate court, and almost en-
tirely to questions of law so
There are good reasons for vesting the decision of such controversies
in administrative tribunals (as has been done in thirty-nine of the
states, including all of the great industrial areas) "In both its legisla-
tive and its judicial aspects, the tribunal can develop a technical
familiarity with its problems to the end that, in the language of Mr
Justice Holmes, its decisions 'express an intuition of experience which
outruns analysis and sum up many unnamed and tangled impressions,
impressions which may lie beneath consciousness without losing their
worth' "81 Mr Justice Brandeis commented, "Two decades of experience
in the states testify to the appropriateness of the administrative process
as applied to workmen's compensation controversies ,,2
7 Rzma REv STAT § 7697-1
"Maryland, Ohio and Oregon have similar procedure Vermont which
allows retrial to a jury, has no administrative rehearing Hawaii has no
centralized commission to conduct its rehearing, and permits jury trial on
appeal to the county circuit court North Dakota permits jury retrial on
jurisdictional facts Iowa provides for jury trial in one unusual fact situa-
tion
Most interesting is the fact that of the eight jurisdictions providing
judicial administration of their acts only two, New Mexico and Alaska,
permit unlimited right to trial by jury Two others, Alabama and Wyoming
permit jury trial in certain cases
77Mr Justice Brandeis exaggerated when he said that nearly all state
courts have construed the state workmen's compensation laws as limiting
judicial review to matters of law, in Crowell v Benson, 285 U S 22, 65
(1932) (dissent) The following states provide a rehearing upon the facts
in trial court but without a jury:
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida Illinois, Kansas, Montana and Nebraska
New Jersey and Rhode Island substitute summary court proceedings for
administrative rehearings
Texas provides a trial de novo
78 Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina
79 Colorado, South Dakota80 California, Idaho, Indiana Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New York,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Utah
Arizona Minnesota and Puerto Rico apparently leave some questions of
fact open to their supreme courts
As to the exact province of the court in such appeals, see Comment
Workmen's Compensation: Review of facts found by industrial commissions
(1929) 14 Comr L Q 25081STASON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
(1937) 104
82Crowell v Benson, 285 U S 22, 80 (1932) (dissent)
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Surely the summary procedure83 and liberal rules of evidence8" of
such commissions, added to this experience and fund of technical
knowledge, can come closest to determining the difficult questions of
fact which characterize these cases, "perhaps too much one of opinion,
and not enough one of fact," as Judge Fullerton described it
One other argument for giving some finality to the decisions of our
department is found in Mr Justice Brandeis' dissent in Crowell v
Benson Few cases, he remarked, had arisen under the Longshoremen's
Act upon questions of law If issues triable before the Commissioner
might be contested in court, the prestige of the administrative tribunal
would suffer, persistence in controversy would be encouraged, litigation
of appeals would increase, and the purpose of the act would, in part,
be defeated 8l Surely the shoe fits
V
Our Industrial Insurance Act was intended to effect a prompt, effec-
tive, extra-judicial remedy for injured workmen and their dependents
The necessity of this course had been dictated by experience in the
courts, and its desirability has been proven by the phenomenal develop-
ment of administrative agencies to deal with the problem Yet we are
witness to a remarkable contrary trend towards encouraging court
litigation of such cases in this state
One basic cause of this trend is the low scale of compensation avail-
able under the act With the increased schedule which seems assured, 6
awards may become commensurate with present-day living costs, and
one source of irritation will have been dealt with, temporarily But
certain weaknesses in the act will remain, and until these are dealt
with our workmen's compensation law must fall short of its high purpose
M BAYARD CRUTCHER
"At least twenty-five jurisdictions; including all eight which retain
court administration of workmen's compensation, provide for summary
procedure
8,At least fourteen jurisdictions have statutes relaxing common law
rules of evidence Even so, the break with common law rules has not
been easy; see Wigmore and Ross, supra note 61
8 Cit note 82 above
8 Two initiatives are pending, both substantially increasing the amounts
of awards under the compensation schedule
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